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COMMENTS
PROBLEMS IN THE APPLICATION OF DUTY-RISK
ANALYSIS TO JURY TRIALS IN LOUISIANA
Introduction
The acceptance and judicial evolution of legal rules of con-
duct are guided by the recognition that they are designed only
to protect some persons under some circumstances against
some risks.' The development of tort law is characterized by
the identification of such rules of conduct and the attempt to
provide an analytical framework for determining which inter-
ests of the individual require protection and under what cir-
cumstances such protection should be afforded.' That all inter-
ests are not extended unlimited protection is due to the coun-
tervailing necessity of preserving, because of the benefits to the
collective whole, the freedom of individual human action.3 It is
generally agreed that activity falling below a certain standard
of care which causes injury to another should be punished, but
in conjunction with this exists the common feeling that a man
should not be held responsible for all consequences of his con-
duct no matter how attenuated the causal relation. The law, it
seems, is geared towards striking "a more or less instinctive
compromise between the logical implications of the two points
1. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. Rav. 60, 73 (1956). Profes-
sor Malone's article contains invaluable insights into the mental processes involved in
the disposition of a tort case, and for this reason will be referred to extensively in the
course of this work.
2. L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 6 (1927). Professor Green asserts:
"[Alt the foundation of every lawsuit, this problem of interests must necessarily
arise." Id. Seldom is protection demanded for an interest which the jurisprudence has
previously not had an opportunity to consider. The problem lies in ascertaining
whether the interest should be accorded protection under a particular set of facts.
3. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 211, 349 (1924). Courts simply refuse
to recognize all actually-caused consequences because of the acute unfairness that this
would entail. Holmes viewed the problem from an economic perspectiveas follows:
"[Tihe public generally profits by individual activity. As action cannot be avoided,
and tends to the public good, there is obviously no policy in throwing the hazard of
what is at once desirable and inevitable upon the actor." 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
107 (1881).
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of view.' Judicial opinions reflect the constant juggling of the
value of deterring the behavior with the justice of shifting the
loss from the injured to the injurer.
Drawing the parameters of the rule of conduct so as to
effect the proper balance is an issue with which the judicial
system is destined to wrestle. Analytical tools are used to frame
the issue in such a way as to provide for a clear focus on, and
cogent articulation of, the considerations which of necessity are
present in every case. Forty-nine states employ a language
technique 5 called "proximate cause." Like all legal phrases,
''proximate cause" was originally intended as merely a term of
art, but it has come to assume the role of a talismanic standard
often imbued with a mystical outcome-determinative nature of
its own. ' The degree to which a language technique captures
the substantive considerations entering into the actual deci-
sional calculus is an appropriate gauge of its analytical and
communicative worth. Because an explanation of the rational
process of judgment is obscured by the reflexive invocation of
the phrase, "proximate cause" is sorely lacking as a language
technique. Only Louisiana has sought to free itself from the
"chrysallis of causation jargon"7 spun from the pens of appel-
4. Edgerton, supra note 3, at 349 n.136.
5. L. GREN, JUDGE AND JURY 43-49 (1930). The term "language technique" refers
to the adoption and consistent use of certain key terms for the purpose of communicat-
ing the mental process involved in judicial decision-making. Language techniques are
not self-executing, but in directing the decision-making process they may be more or
less successful in prompting consideration of what should be the dispositive factors.
See notes 50-78, infra, and accompanying text.
6. Dean Green aptly observes:
It is not that a scientific language device is not desirable. It is merely that too
much emphasis has been put upon it, and too much expected of it. The attempt
has been made and still is made to make language do the service of judging
itself. There can be no such substitution. Words are the machinery by which
the power of thought is handled, but if there is no such power put into them
the words are lifeless. In the administration of law, both the judge who surren-
ders this power to phrases as well as the judge who spends his time attempting
to pattern phrases to control succeeding judges in the cases to come, can only
do his science ill.
L. GREEN, supra note 5, at 47. See Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33
HARv. L. REV. 633 (1920); Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate
Cause, 20 CAL. L. REV. 229 (1932); Green, Are There Dependable Rules of Causation?,
77 U. PA. L. REV. 601 (1929); James & Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L. REv. 761 (1951).
7. Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive-it-Yourself v. American Beverage
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late judges and legal scholars to envelop "proximate cause," by
its relatively recent adoption of duty-risk analysis. The empha-
sis here is not only upon the implementation of a new language
technique, but upon the restructuring of the judge-jury rela-
tionship with the hope of transforming torts jurisprudence into
a more aggressive and efficient method of social engineering.'
Previous law review comments upon Louisiana appellate
court decisions have hailed the advent of duty-risk as a
triumph of reason over the tyranny of proximate cause rules.9
As yet, however, the feasibility of a specific application of this
approach on the district court level has not been considered.',
With regard to the traditional allocation of judge-jury func-
tions within the framework of proximate cause analysis and the
language technique therein employed, it is the aim of this work
to clarify the practical problems inherent in the implementa-
tion of duty-risk in Louisiana jury trials.
The Conceptual Framework of Duty-Risk
The chief proponent of duty-risk analysis, Dean Leon
Green, has as a central tenet of his theory of torts litigation the
definitive disjunction of the roles of fact-finder and law-maker.
The task of law-making is to be reserved for the judge as the
one most qualified to deal with the balancing of social inter-
est." Under proximate cause, however, the jury is permitted to
Company, 30 LA. L. REV. 363, 377 (1970). See Beale, supra note 6; Carpenter, supra
note 6; McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARv. L. REv. 149 (1925).
8. L. GREEN, supra note 5; L. GREEN, supra note 2.
9. See Malone, supra note 7; Robertson, Reason Versus Rule in Louisiana Tort
Law: Dialogues on Hill v. Lundin & Assoc., Inc., 34 LA. L. REV. 1 (1973). These two
articles are the definitive works on duty-risk in Louisiana. Both contain a concise
explanation of duty-risk analysis and an assessment of the relative success of the
abpellate courts in applying the formula. Each scholar applauds the efforts of the
Louisiana judiciary in attempting to raise the veil from the policy factors underlying
tort law.
10. Robertson, supra note 9, at 15 n.30.
11. L. GREEN, supra note 5. See also Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence
Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928), wherein he states:
[I]t would be passing strange if the delimination of the law's protection, duty
vel non, is to be passed over to the jury. That would end any possible hope of
law crystallization; there can be no such thing as statement or restatement of
the law where the jury must pass judgment; the very purpose of jury trial is to
1979]
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pass upon the fundamental policy issues regarding the limits
of legal duty. Causation terminology is employed to encompass
not only the factual" issue of cause-in-fact, but also the dis-
tinct legal questions of duty and scope of duty.' 3 The judge's
law-making function, that is, determining the existence of a
rule of conduct and the precise interests protected, is, in effect,
abdicated in favor of the'jury; additionally, "proximate cause"
is paraded as the objective determinant of liability rather than
perceived as a subjective expression of the decision of whether
the requirements for liability were met.'4 Judicial opinions
inevitably seem more legitimate if they evidence minimal
human input in adhering to, or being deduced from, some ex-
ternal standard of justice, even though actual conclusions are
arrived at through an individual perception and application of
such external standard to the conflicting economic and social
interests involved. Thus, that which constitutes "proximate
give a new deal in each case.
Id. at 1029.
12. For a discussion of the "factual" nature of the cause-in-fact issue, see notes
70-78, infra, and accompanying text.
13. Just exactly how distinct these components are, and the ramifications upon
the judge-jury allocation, is the specific concern of this paper.
14. Comment, Proximate Cause in Louisiana, 16 LA. L. REv. 391, 397 (1956). The
myriad attempts by courts and scholars to define the cause-for-which-liability-will-be-
imposed, or proximate cause, as a self-executing formula where the facts of each case
need only be plugged in to automatically reach the correct result, has, for the most
part, been futile. The factors which enter into determining whether the defendant will
be charged for the injury sustained vary with every case, and cannot be reduced to an
all-inclusive or universally applicable test. Louisiana courts have expressed proximate
cause strictly in terms of the temporal sequence ("that which immediately produces
the effect, as distinguished from remote, mediate, or predisposing cause," Cruze v.
Harvey & Jones, 134 So. 730, 731-32 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931)), or by the quantitative
dominance of the cause ("efficient cause-the cause that sets other acts in motion that
produces the accident without an intervening and independent agency," Allen v.
Louisiana Creamery, Inc., 184 So. 395, 397 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938)), or by particular
emphasis on the foreseeability of the consequences of the conduct ("the rule of law is
that a party is responsible for the reasonably to be expected consequences of a negli-
gent act," Stumpf v. Baronne Bldg., 16 La. App. 702, 704, 135 So. 100, 102 (Orl. Cir.
1931)), or, as viewed from hindsight, the logical probability of the consequence result-
ing ("it is no defense that the particular injurious consequence was unforeseen, im-
probable, and not to have been reasonably expected so long as it was the natural
consequence of the negligence of defendant's servant," Atkins v. Bush, 141 La. 180,
187, 74 So. 897, 899 (1917)). It can be said that the flexibility of the formula was equal
to the demands of justice.
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cause" varies to the extent such perception by each individual
trier varies. Purposive direction and uniformity are necessarily
precluded. .,
Dean Green's contribution to negligence theory was to
seize upon the acknowledged components of proximate cause
-cause-in-fact and legal cause-and attempt to isolate their
determination for analytical purposes. However, bound up
with his duty-risk language technique is a modified view of the
traditional allocation of power between the judge and the jury.
Cause-in-fact is left for the jury to decide with the aid of mini-
mal instructions, devoid of the intricate and confusing plethora
of charges that have evolved to accommodate proximate
cause,'" while legal cause is translated into a question of the
scope of defendant's duty of care." The judge's function is to
rule upon whether the interest asserted by plaintiff is entitled
to protection against the hazard encountered as a result of
defendant's act. He therefore withdraws from the jury's do-
main the consideration of the "proximity of the cause" and
reserves for himself the job of reconciling the policy factors
involved in determining the point at which liability ceases to
follow consequences.'" Louisiana appellate courts have,
15. Professor Edgerton expresses his skepticism as follows:
My thesis is that it neither is nor should be possible to extract from the
cases rules which cover the subject and are definite enough to solve cases; that
the solution of cases depends upon a balancing of considerations which tend to
show that it is, or is not, reasonable or just to treat the act as the cause of the
harm-that is, upon a balancing of conflicting interests, individual and social;
that these considerations are indefinite in number and value, and incommensur-
able; that legal cause is justly attachable cause. I believe that, while logic is
useful in the premises, it is inadequate; that intuition is necessary and certainty
impossible.
Edgerton, supra note 3, at 211.
16. Direct cause, legal cause, efficient cause, superseding cause, intervening
cause, remote cause, contributing cause-all these have served to increase the com-
plexity of the language technique while adding little clarity or guidance to actual
decision-making.
17. See generally L. GREEN, supra note 5; L. GREEN, supra note 2..
18. See the authorites cited in note 17, supra. This is the most difficult aspect
of the administration of justice in torts litigation. Since absolute protection is never
accorded any interest, the court is confronted with this delicate inquiry in every case.
Dean Green, who was highly responsible for directing judges' attention away from
abstract formulas and toward concrete policy factors, explains the problem:
The hazards to which any interest is subjected are so numerous, and the reach
19791 1083
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through the use of the duty-risk language technique, been set
free to elucidate their consideration of the policy factors held
to be dispositive in a particular case. A hybrid terminology
and/or reasoning, though, is occasionally employed.'" The ques-
tion remains whether the advent of duty-risk will really mark
a departure from the manner of handling torts litigation on the
district court level. There is no problem of judge-jury allocation
in the appellate courts; the appellate judge had the same con-
trol on review of the duty issue when proximate cause was
employed as he now has under duty-risk. The change is simply
in the adoption of a more effective language technique. But is
modification of lower court litigation through the incorporation
of both the language technique and the duty-risk division of
labor between judge and jury really practical?
Most explanations of duty-risk utilize a four point model,
concentrating on causation, duty, breach of duty, and dam-
ages. However, as will become evident later, these issues should
not be treated as compartmentalized inquiries. Each spoke of
the wheel draws more or less on the same evidentiary facts; all
contribute to the configuration in which each part has meaning
and significance by reason of its relationship to the whole and
each other.20 Nevertheless, the following discussion of Green's
theory of duty-risk will conform to precedent and approach
these problems seriatim. The language technique as reflective
of any rule which the plaintiff may invoke in its vindication is so poorly defined,
and there are so few external guides to tell a court whether a particular hazard
is within the range of the rule invoked, that the problem may well prove bewil-
dering. Nevertheless, the court must determine it in every case, consciously or
otherwise.... The most thoroughly explored and developed rule is without exact
boundary and since conflicts between the multitudes of interests now recog-
nized, as well as those being given recognition from time to time, are constantly
arising, the boundaries of the rules which 'protect such interests are subject to
constant readjustment. In making such adjustments, and in the recognition of
risks as falling within the bounds of those rules, the courts fashion the law.
L. GREEN, supra note 2, at 12-14.
19. For example, in Ainsworth v. Treadway, 361 So. 2d 957 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1978), the court held that a certain statutory duty was not designed to guard against
the risk to which the plaintiff was exposed. The inquiry was therefore for all practical
purposes at an end. However, it seems that the court could not resist the pull of
tradition when it further announced that the "gross intervening negligence [of a third
party] . . . absolves [the defendant] from liability." Id. at 962.
20. Lewis, Proximate Cause in Law, 7 FA. ST. B.A.J. 138, 158 (1933).
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of the trier's conceptualization in resolving a torts case will be
explained here. The effect of a different allocation of power will
be examined subsequently.
Causation
The first step in establishing a defendant's liability is to
identify him as one who set forces in motion which ultimately
contributed to the plaintiff's injury.2 Our empirical knowledge
of cause and effect is the basis for ascertaining the existence of
the minimal relationship between conduct and injury as a pre-
requisite to further inquiry. According to Green, the emphasis
here is upon cause as a neutral issue, a natural phenomenon
not subject to a metaphysical test. The quality of the defen-
dant's conduct is irrelevant; the focus is solely quantitative and
divorced from normative judgments.22 Determining whether
defendant's conduct was the cause of the harm for the purposes
of liability is relegated to another stage in the analysis dealing
with the scope of the defendant's duty.
In addition, causal relation is never presumed from the
fact of injury or a showing that the defendant violated a general
duty of due care. The risk imposed upon the plaintiff in a
certain situation may well fall beyond the boundary of the duty
breached. 23 Judges often unwittingly encourage doctrinal in-
consistency by attempting to ground causal relation on a speci-
fied act of negligence. Negligence, however, is not the conduct
itself, but a conclusion of law with respect to the social value
of such conduct in light of the hazard involved. "Negligence
must be based on causal relation but causal relation can never
be based on negligence in the air. '2
21. Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543,
546 (1962). In Laird v. Travelers Insurance Co., 263 La. 199, 267 So. 2d 714 (1972), the
Louisiana Supreme Court employed a "necessary ingredient" test in determining
cause-in-fact. In truth, it is nothing more than the but-for test since the defendant's
conduct is seen as being an essential prerequisite to the injury occurring in the specific
manner that it did.
22. In Laird it was said: "In resolving this question [of causation] we make no
inquiry into whether the act was unlawful or negligent." 263 La. at 210, 267 So. 2d at
717.
23. Green, supra note 21, at 560.
24. Id. at 551. The issue is often posited as 'whether defendant's negligence was
a cause-in-fact of plaintiff's injury." Thus, our defunct proximate cause language
1979] 1085
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Duty
The question of "legal cause" comprises the second half of
the proximate cause issue." An affirmative finding of cause-in-
fact necessitates a policy appraisal of the social advantages of
labelling this consequence as one for which society will hold the
defendant responsible, and thus shifting the loss. Plaintiff
must initially assert the interest injured as one entitled to pro-
tection before it is decided that defendant, under the circum-
stances, was one of those charged with a duty to protect it.21
Actually, to the extent the general duty of due care is narrowed
to accommodate the specific conduct in question, a rule of law
is constructed after the event occurred which was theoretically
in force at the time of the occurrence. The narrowing process,
or the determination whether the particular hazard encoun-
tered fell within the scope of defendant's duty, requires a
broad, searching evaluation of several factors."
Foreseeability is the term generally used to direct the in-
quiry into this issue under proximate cause. 8 That the defen-
dant's conduct should reasonably have been expected to pre-
cipitate such harm as occurred is considered sufficient to im-
pose liability. The scope of the defendant's obligation to pro-
tect the interest of the plaintiff under duty-risk does not con-
form to this micro-approach, but instead is broadened by sev-
technique still seeks to rule us from the grave; formerly, the inquiry centered on the
defendant's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident. If negligence is found with
respect to the plaintiff's injury, though, then cause-in-fact has presumably already
been affirmatively established. See Boyer v. Johnson, 360 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (La. 1978)
("defendant's breach of duty was a cause-in-fact of the boy's death"). Could this also
be some form of subconscious acknowledgment that the determination of cause-in-fact
is not neutral but purposeful, and colored by the ultimate aim of the inquiry? See notes
70-78 infra, and accompanying text. See also Malone, supra note 7, at 371.
25. W. PROSSER, TORTS 236-50 (4th ed. 1971).
26. L. GREEN, supra note 2, at 5-11; Green, supra note 11. Generally, individual
interests subject to protection may be subdivided into rights of personality, property,
and economic advantage. The law evolves not only by extending the limits of protec-
tion of a certain rule, but also by identifying interests within these subdivisions which
will give rise to a rule of conduct protecting them against certain hazards. For instance,
although the common law did not countenance damages for mental distress, it is now
an accepted form of compensatory relief.
27. Green, supra note 11, at 1024-35.
28. W. PROSSER, supra note 25, at 250-70.
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eral additional considerations more appropriate for the further-
ing of attractive social policies. 9 One of Dean Green's major
contentions is that the particular equities between the parties
are often subjugated to the objectives of efficient administra-
tion of the judicial system and the promotion of the collective
economic well-being. 0 This macro-approach is more conducive
to the actual law-making intrinsic to the adjudication of tort
cases.
Negligence
Negligence, as a standard of civil liability, requires shift-
ing the loss to the defendant if he has caused the plaintiff's
injury and in so doing engaged in substandard conduct.3' The
breach of the duty of care under both proximate cause and
duty-risk formulas entails a bifurcated inquiry: (1) would a
reasonable person have foreseen the possibility of harm as a
consequence of his conduct, and (2) did the defendant fail to
exercise such reasonable care as to avoid the harm? The defen-
dant's conduct is viewed in light of the ambient circum-
stances .
32
Foreseeability is pressed into double service under proxi-
29. See notes 7-8, supra, and accompanying text.
30. Dean Green delineates the following determinants of duty with the observa-
tion that "[ilf a human desire or interest cannot be given protection without offending
one or more of what might be called the 'social senses' corresponding to these several
factors, then it must go without protection; there is no duty to respect it." Green, supra
note 11, at 1034.
1) The administrative factor. A court will not grant recovery under a certain
rule if the adoption of such a rule will be accompanied by difficult and ponder-
ous operation of the legal machinery.
2) The moral or ethical factor. Liability is imposed commensurate with the
degree of the defendant's culpability. A rule of law will be expanded in direct
proportion with the unreasonableness of the defendant's conduct.
3) The economic factor. The decision to formulate a rule of law requiring a
shifting of the loss is often upheld for reasons of economic efficiency and the
collective well-being.
4) The justice factor. Frequently, these other factors may prohibit the court
from concentrating on the particular equities of the case before it.
Id.
31. W. PRossaR, supra note 25, at 139-90.
32. Green, The Submission of Issues in Negligence Cases, 18 MIAMI L. Ray. 30,
38 (1963).
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mate cause;33 both the issue of negligence and whether that
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury are often re-
solved through resort to the foreseeability formula. 3 It should
be noted that negligence as defined under proximate cause
theory is not therefore necessarily actionable negligence since
the unreasonableness of the defendant's conduct is not neces-
sarily related to the harm which actually ensued. The negli-
gence inquiry under duty-risk, however, parallels the scope-of-
duty issue, but only to the extent that forseeability is also a
determinant of the latter. The defendant theoretically is negli-
gent only as to that which was forseeable, but as was explained
above, the scope of his duty to use due care may extend beyond
this point if the judge perceives that the relevant policy goals
justify requiring the defendant to bear the loss.35 Thus, to Dean
Green the issues of negligence and ultimate liability are not
coextensive under duty-risk, and upon the validity of' his dis-
claimer rests the practical success of the theory as a viable
formula for district court litigation. 3
Damages
Often a plaintiff will suffer some damages for which the
defendant should not be held responsible. Every loss must be
one which the defendant under the circumstances was required
to protect the plaintiff against .3 In other words, any loss that
resulted from a hazard that fell outside the scope of the defen-
dant's duty is not legally attributable to his conduct for the
purpose of obtaining compensation.
33. See note 28, supra, and accompanying text.
34. The limits of duty and the violation of duty are therefore determined by the
same test. This so-called "danger" test is seen by Dean Green as "the strangest chapter
in all tort law." Green, supra note 11, at 1029. However, the breach of duty issue under
duty-risk is determined by the "danger" test. See notes 50-52, infra, and accompanying
text.
35. This is not liability without fault because initial blameworthiness with re-
spect to some foreseeable risks has been determined.
36. See notes 50-52, 58-63, infra, and accompanying text.
37. Green, supra note 32, at 46.
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Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury
The Judge's Function
The division of labor between the judge and the jury under
duty-risk has significant substantive impact on torts litiga-
tion."' The framework within which each issue is to be resolved
is simplified and narrowed in order that both judge and jury
maintain control over their proper sphere of the litigation. The
judge's primary function is "to pass upon the larger questions
which go to limit responsibility generally. '3 He must decide
when initially confronted with the duty question whether it
would be unjust, inapproliriate, or simply bad social policy
under the particular situation to hold the defendant responsi-
ble. Although the judge's task should be to administer the law
defining the duty, in most tort cases there is no applicable
legislative will to interpret; 0 private wrongs go uncompensated
unless the court decides that there should be a rule of right
conduct applicable to the facts. Under the proximate cause
formula, the jury is allowed free reign in determining the exist-
ence and reach of a rule.4' The direction of social policy is
38. L. GREEN, supra note 5; F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 871-89
(1956). Decisions on many issues are often dependent on he who decides them. In a
very general way, the divergence between judge and jury could be said to occur when-
ever the demands of social policy outweigh the particular equities in the case before
the court. Thus, when officials at a state institution negligently release an inmate who
proceeds immediately to drive a car recklessly into the plaintiff, a jury could, respond-
ing to their innate sense of fair play, justly hold the state liable, while the judge may
not be willing to countenance such a burden. The judge's recourse is to resort to the
terms of the language technique, such as "no duty" or "no proximate cause as a matter
of law." See Cappel v. Pierson, 15 La. App. 524, 132 So. 391 (2d Cir. 1931).
39. L. GREEN, supra note 5, at 30. The judge also frames the issues and restricts
the admissible evidence to that which is relevant to prove the facts necessary for
passing judgment on the issues. Of course, if there is not enough evidence to raise a
reasonable inference, the judge declines to submit that issue for jury determination.
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 38, at 873-76. The judge further influences the
outcome in his choice of instructions to the jury. They are designed to guard against
untenable assumptions by the jury and improper use of the facts. See Farley,
Inst,:uctions to Juries, 42 YALE L.J. 194, 218 (1933). Unfortunately, there is no way of
forcing the jury to consider the case exactly as requested, and no method of discovering
whether they, in fact, did.
40. Even when relevant legislation exists, for example if a particular Louisiana
Civil Code article applies, the duty issue must be formulated with regard to the facts
of the particular case.
41. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 38, at 1059. The jury examines the facts
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
thrust into the hands of twelve laymen who confine their con-
sideration to the parties before them, generally never endeavor-
ing to evaluate the impact of a particular decision on the polity
as a whole. With the application of duty-risk analysis, however,
it is the clear obligation of the judge to decide whether a rule
of law should apply to the facts before him, and if so, to formu-
late one. He may look to precedents, invoke analogous reason-
ing from other similar rules of conduct, and consider any social
and economic interests he considers relevant to the instant
case.42
The judge retains control over the duty issue throughout
the litigation. An explicit ruling may be required at the outset
if the defendant chooses to file an exception of no cause of
action or motion for summary judgment based upon no duty
as a matter of law. The judge should assume the facts as
pleaded by the plaintiff and provisionally determine whether
a rule of law should properly be constructed to place the risk
of harm, by virtue of his conduct, on the defendant. After the
plaintiff has presented his evidence, the judge has a better
conception of the actual events which prompted the litigation.
If defendant moves for a directed verdict, the judge can reas-
sess the environmental details-the affinity of causal likeli-
hood between defendant's behavior and plaintiff's subsequent
injury, and the qualitative nature of such behavior-in order
to more accurately weigh the specific values in contest before
him. Again, subsequent to the presentation of all the evidence,
the judge must decide if it is sufficient to raise a reasonable
inference of both cause-in-fact and negligence to warrant a
jury's judgment. Of course, the same evidence is fundamental
to the judge's law-making competence on the duty issue. He,
therefore, may grant a dismissal for one of two reasons-either
the facts under which he previously'based an affirmative ruling
on the duty issue were not supported by sufficient evidence, or
the evidence convinced him that the rule of law relied upon by
and decides whether there ought to be a rule of law covering the situation-whether
defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, rather than determin-
ing if the facts call into play the duty promulgated by the judge. See notes 58-63, infra,
and accompanying text.
42. L. GREEN, supra note 2; Green, supra note 11.
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plaintiff should not extend to this particular risk."
It is crucial for the purposes of appellate review that the
judge phrase his decisions on these motions in terms of the
scope of the defendant's duty, or the lack of evidence suffi-
cent to support a reasonable inference necessary to bring such
a rule of conduct into play. A finding that there was no "proxi-
mate cause" as a matter of law often does not distinguish
between a judgment based upon insufficient evidence with re-
spect to cause-in-fact or negligence, or a basic policy determi-
nation on the duty issue."
The Jury's Function
It is the jury's responsibility to evaluate the evidence and
establish the facts to which the law is to be applied. The mere
submission of a case to the jury by the judge under duty-risk
evinces a tentative conclusion on his part that it would not be
inappropriate to hold the defendant responsible. 5 A rule of
conduct has been approved by the judge in the abstract, and
it is the function of the jury to resolve such questions of fact as
would or would not bring the rule into play. Dean Green main-
tains that the judge should actually instruct the jury "as to the
specific duty owed by the defendant and its limitations in
terms of the risks imposed."" The duty charge should be hypo-
thetical-if the jury finds the facts as alleged by the plaintiff,
then the loss may be shifted to the defendant. The ultimate
issue of law is consequently lifted out of the jury's sphere of
competence, and their role is reduced to determining whether
the evidence proves the facts about which the judge has provi-
sionally constructed the rule of conduct. The particular diffi-
43. Green, supra note 32, at 36 n.18. The absence of duty is fundamental error
any may even be raised on appeal.
44. Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEx. L. REV. 42 (1962).
45. L. GREEN, supra note 2, at 90-93; Green, supra note 11, at 1030; Malone,
supra note 1, at 75. Dean Green takes the view that the jury never decides the duty
issue. By submitting the case to the jury, the law has, in effect, recognized a rule of
due care encompassing this risk. The jury's agreement is all that is necessary to impose
liability. However, this is not quite accurate. Often the judge will not be convinced
that the duty does extend to the plaintiff's injury, and will cede the matter wholly to
the jury for their less legalistic, but more intuitive reaction. F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra note 38, at 1060.
46. Green, supra note 32, at 37.
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culties that inhere in this approach will be discussed in the
final section.
The jury must first pass on the question of cause-in-fact
and decide whether defendant's conduct "had anything to do
with plaintiff's injury."47 It should be impressed upon the jury
that they are not to concern themselves at this point with the
question of liability but are to ascertain whether there is a
rationally perceivable cause and effect relationship between
the two events. Instructions should explain that this issue is
not affected by the existence of other causes but is confined to
the problem of identifying the defendant's conduct as a neces-
sary condition to plaintiff's sustaining the injury."
In contrast to the purely factual nature of the cause-in-fact
inquiry is the submission of the negligence issue in the form of
a "metaphysical" standard. The jury is empowered to narrow
the general duty of due care in constructing a standard of rea-
sonable conduct to accomodate the particular facts of the
case." Based upon their common sense and experience, the
metaphysical standard of reasonableness is translated into a
yardstick for measuring the defendant's act. Interests and val-
ues are weighed in determining whether the defendant's con-
duct fell below the standard relating to the risk of harm im-
posed upon the plaintiff. 0 Under duty-risk, then, negligence is
47. Malone, supra note 1, at 66. The allocation of the cause-in-fact issue to the
jury is based on the assumption that it is a purely factual issue, and it is to the extent
judgmental factors are not intentionally brought to bear. But see notes 70-78 infra, and
accompanying text. Professor Malone has aptly demonstrated influence of the policy
factors in the course of the inquiry into cause-in-fact. The distinction between ques-
tions of law and fact has always been a hazy one. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE 185 (1898); Thayer, "Law and Fact" in Jury Trials, 4 HARv. L. REV. 147
(1890).
48. Green, supra note 32, at 37.
49. L. GREEN, supra note 2, at 73.
50. Id. at 73-74. Normally, the weighing process involves increasing the amount
of caution required relative to the likelihood and seriousness of the harm. Whether the
caution required will be so great as to abrogate the conduct creating the risk depends
upon the social interest promoted by the conduct. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra
note 38, at 930-33; W. PROSSER, supra note 25, at 146-49. Judge Learned Hand was of
the view that a cross-section of the community was more apt to give an accurate
assessment of the care and prudence manifested by the defendant. He believed the
factors involved were "not susceptible of any quantitave estimate .... For this reason
a solution always involves some preference or choice between incommensurables, and
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only actionable if the existence of the specific harm-causing
risk is considered a violation of the duty owed to the plaintiff.
The defendant's conduct could conceivably be substandard
with respect to other risks of injury, but he was not guilty of
actionable negligence if the plaintiff was injured through the
culmination of a risk lying outside the boundary of the defen-
dant's duty.5' Such is not the usual method of determining
negligence contemplated under the proximate cause formula.
The defendant is guilty of negligence if any unreasonable risks
accompany his conduct, without regard to the specific risk of
harm which ultimately injured the plaintiff. Negligence under
duty-risk immediately establishes liability. Liability under
proximate cause depends upon whether such inchoate negli-
gence is deemed to be the "proximate cause" of the actual
harm which befell the plaintiff.52
Duty-Risk and Jury Trials: Lynch v. Fisher
The following will be an exercise in the application of a
pure duty-risk analysis to a jury trial in Louisiana. The facts
will be borrowed from Lynch v. Fisher,53 a 1949 Louisiana ap-
pellate court decision. In that case, the defendant's employee
parked a pulpwood truck on a highway without leaving a pro-
per clearance on the pavement or positioning lights or flares to
warn oncoming motorists. While driving down the highway,
it is consigned to a jury because their decision is thought most likely to accord with
commonly accepted standards, real or fancied." Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612
(2d Cir. 1940).
51. "With respect to the risk, as distinguished from the conduct which injures
the plaintiff, the defendant has in fact exercised due care." Campbell, Duty, Fault,
and Legal Cause, 1938 Wis. L. REv. 402, 409. This statement reflects the interlocking
of the negligence and duty issues, and the degree to which the two inquiries draw upon
the same considerations. This is a problem which presents itself when one seeks to
confine the scope of duty issue to the judge. The high-water mark of the discussion
occurs in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). See
also Dias, The The Duty Problem in Negligence, 13 CAMS. L.J. 198 (1955); Green, Are
Negligence and Proximate Cause Determinable by the Same Test? 1 TEx. L. REv. 243,
423 (1923); Green, The Palsgraf Case, 30 COLUM. L. Rav. 789 (1930); Seavey, Mr.
Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REv. 372 (1939).
52. See the majority and dissenting opinions in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,
248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); W. PROSSER, supra note 25, at 254-60; Green, supra
note 44, at 59.
53. 41 So. 2d 692, 695 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949).
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Robert Gunter collided with the truck thus trapping himself
and his wife in the front seat of his car. The plaintiff, Lynch,
who lived nearby, ran to the scene of the accident and pro-
ceeded to extricate both Gunters from the burning wreckage.
While retrieving a floor mat as a cushion for Mrs. Gunter,
plaintiff found a gun under the seat and handed it to Mr.
Gunter. Mr. Gunter, being temporarily mentally deranged
and delirious as a result of the accident, fired the pistol at the
plaintiff, the bullet striking him in the left ankle and inflicting
serious injuries.
The Judge's Formulation of Duty
Upon the defendant's exception of no cause or right of
action, the trial judge nonsuited the plaintiff, finding as a mat-
ter of law that defendant's employee's negligence was not the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. The appellate court, how-
ever, reversed, primarily by disclaiming reliance on the test
of foreseeability, and held Fisher liable, in effect, for events
which at the time of his employee's conduct the employee
could not have reasonably expected to later occur. The court
realized that sole dependence on a foreseeability test for de-
termining liability simply does not promote a just result,54 and
instead chose hindsight as the most appropriate perspective
for resolving the question of the extent of the duty owed by
Fisher's employee to Lynch. The test of foreseeability would
have excluded the improbable and almost bizarre manner of
injury from being a consequence for which Fisher would be
held responsible. Even so, legal theories such as the foresee-
ability or rule of possibilities test serve only to identify the
issues and reduce them to convenient terms, and are not "a
means to point unerringly to acceptable results."5 The situa-
tion here challenged the judge to actively mold the law in re-
sponse to this particular set of facts. The plaintiff had placed
his own safety at peril for the socially valuable act of rescuing
54. See Bohlen, The Probable or the Natural Consequence as the Test of Liabil-
ity in Negligence, 49 AM. L. REG. 79, 148 (1901); Dias, The Breach Problem and the
Duty of Care, 30 TUL. L. REv. 377 (1956); Green, Are Negligence and Proximate Cause
Determinable by the Same Test? 1 Tax L. REV. 243, 423 (1923); Payne, The Direct
Consequences of a Negligent Act, 5 CUR. LEG. PROB. 189 (1952). See also note 32, supra,
and accompanying text.
55. Green, The Palsgraf Case, 30 COLUM L. Rzy. 789, 796 (1930). See also L.
GREEN, supra note 5, at 214.
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a driver from a wreck caused, in part, by the socially unrea-
sonable act of the defendant. The defendant's employee was,
of course, negligent with respect to the foreseeable risk of
someone like Gunter colliding with him from behind. The court
obviously felt that such gross negligence with respect to that
risk should carry over to other risks of injury along the causal
chain, whether foreseeable or not.51
The court thus found that the lower court had incorrectly
applied the law of proximate cause; defendant's employee's
negligence was in fact, the direct and proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury. No guide is given for the resolution of further
cases as to what is or not a proximate cause. The duty-risk
approach, however, provides a terminology for articulating
the factors involved in such a determination.
The greatest obstacle to any attempt to state the limit of
the law's protection in advance of particular conduct is the
sheer multifariousness of human behavior.57 Therefore, to effec-
tively dispose of individual cases, the judge needs a broad for-
mula to direct his judgment-passing capacity. The inquiry into
the existence and scope of the defendant's duty is intended to
serve this purpose. Lynch, through his complaint, was de-
manding protection for a legitimate socially recognized interest
-the safey of his person. He claimed that his right to be secure
from unreasonable risks was violated by the defendant, and
for this reason he suffered injury. The trial judge was required
to explore the relationship between the act of Fisher's em-
ployee in parking the truck and Lynch's suffering of a gun-
shot wound in his left ankle; the judge then was required to
determine whether he should create a rule of law in conformity
with the general standard of due care to govern the occurence.
The rule of law, consequently, is not formulated in the abstract
but rather is grounded upon the particular facts of the case
before the judge and must be specific enough to make it clear
whether the risk of Lynch getting shot was within the scope of
the employee's duty not to park his truck in a position to ob-
struct the highway. 8
56. For a discussion of the interrelationship between causal relation and negli-
gence, see notes 58-63, 70-78, infra, and accompanying text.
57. L. GREEN, supra note 2, at 12; Edgerton, supra note 3, at 221.
58. This is simply to say that the rule of law applicable to defendant's conduct
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Unless the judge can rationally relate these two factual
events in a cause and effect sequence, there is no relevancy
between the events, and without relevancy no basis for asso-
ciating one actor's conduct with another's injury so as to justify
shifting the loss. Thus, if the judge perceives no causal connec-
tion, the plaintiff is nonsuited and the litigation ends. How
great must the affinity of causal likelihood between the defen-
dant's wrong and the plaintiffs injury be for the judge to con-
sider the claim judicially cognizable? "The answer is that the
affinity. must be sufficiently close in the opinion of the judge
to bring into effective play the rule of law that would make the
defendant's conduct wrongful."59 Thus, legal recognition of
cause by the judge is based upon his feeling that, under the
facts, the risk of injury was conceivably the responsibility of
the defendant, and that perceived social goals would not be
thwarted by requiring the loss to be shifted. His formulation of
duty is complete once he is satisfied that the physical and
metaphysical (in the sense of Fisher's employee's conduct be-
ing of such a quality as would justify its recognition as a cause
were the physical relationship between the parking and the
shooting otherwise insufficient to satisfy the minimal require-
ments of cause-in-fact) relationship between the harm and the
conduct is significant enough for policy reasons to legally
establish cause-in-fact. There is therefore no a priori formula-
tion of the duty-the existence of this particular relationship
must be first considered. The critical point to note, though, is
that all that is now necessary for a judgment for the plaintiff
is drawn from the particular facts of the case. Everyone owes a general duty of due
care but, under duty-risk analysis, for the statement of the duty to aid in determining
liability, the specific risk must be keyed to the conduct complained of. See Note,
Impact of the Risk Theory on the Law of Negligence, 63 HARV. L. REv. 671 (1950). Dean
Green asserts:
The general duties stated in terms of "reasonable care" and similar abstractions
are not difficult to state, but when they are so stated they go very little distance
in giving aid to the judge in the particular case. The judge very quickly arrives
at the point where he must say whether the generalization is applicable to the
particular case; whether plaintiff is entitled to any protection under it; whether
defendant was under any duty with respect to the conduct that transpired, and
the interest which was injured.
Green, supra note 11, at 1025-26.
59. Malone, supra note 1, at 72. See Lewis, supra note 20, at 145. See also notes
58-63, 70-78, infra, and accompanying text.
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is the jury's concurrence on the evidence as establishing the
facts forming the basis of the judge's formulation of duty. The
judge, in constructing the defendant's duty, has considered
"cause" in light of the substandard nature of defendant's be-
havior. Negligence, in turn, has been determined by examining
the causative act in terms of the risk imposed-the concept of
"relative" negligence, as discussed earlier, 0 in contrast to the
proximate cause theory of "absolute" negligence. In formulat-
ing the scope of the defendant's duty, the judge thus substan-
tially subsumes all of the elements of a torts case.
Two problems immediately present themselves. First, the
function of rules, and the reason for troubling with the develop-
ment of them, is the convenient treatment of subsequent spe-
cific instances by the generalizations earlier laid down. How-
ever, what precedential value would the duty formulated in
Lynch possess? The case "has just those aspects of uniqueness,
chance, and impalpability which had best be buried and for-
gotten in the verdict of a jury rather than be perpetuated in a
rule of law. It expresses nothing significant of social policy."',
Secondly, permitting the judge to pass on the existence and
extent of the duty obviously strips the jury of their traditional
function as the ultimate arbiters of liability.2 The judge has
affirmatively passed on cause-in-fact; actionable negligence is
coterminous with scope of duty. 3 The jury need only find the
facts as the judge has assumed them to effectively foreclose the
issue of liability.
For example, in Lynch, the judge decides if a duty owed
by Fisher's employee in the parking of his vehicle as he did
extends to the risk of a rescuer (i.e., Lynch) getting shot by
the dazed owner of a colliding vehicle. The judge, if he sub-
mits the questions of fact to the jury, preliminarly determines
that the duty does so extend. If the jury later finds, based up-
on the evidence admitted, that the truck was so parked and
that Lynch suffered harm, judgment for Lynch should follow.64
By ruling that a particular risk is included within the scope of
60. See notes 50-52, supra, and accompanying text.
61. Cowan, The Riddle of the Palsgraf Case, 23 MINN. L. REV. 46, 55 (1938).
62. Id.
63. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 38, at 1060; W. PROSSER, supra note 25, at
255-58. See notes 52-56, supra, and accompanying text.
64. If the truck was so parked, it was a cause-in-fact, and he was also negligent,
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a particular duty, the judge has condemned defendant's con-
duct as creating an unreasonable possibility of harm to the
plaintiff, and if damages do in fact result, Fisher should be re-
quired to pay. 5
The point of this discussion is simply to demonstrate that
"the matter of a tort case can't be split up into various parts
as some undertake."6 The question of proximate cause or scope
of duty partakes of all of the identifiable components of a tort
case; thus, the efforts to allocate one aspect of the litigation to
the judge and another to the jury and the attempt to segregate
causation from duty or duty from negligence is simply unrealis-
tic in the actual administration of justice by jury trial. 7
Under proximate cause analysis the judge's function was
merely to inform the jury of their function and to insure that
any decision reached was rationally supportable. After first
deciding cause-in-fact, the jury was asked whether the plaintiff
was negligent; in other words, were there certain unreasonable
dangers that they could perceive as attendant to his conduct?
The next issue was whether such negligence was a proximate
cause of the injury; in other words, was the specific injury the
culmination of one of the unreasonable dangers that they
should associate with the defendant's conduct so as to hold him
responsible?"6 The benefit of phrasing the issues in such a man-
ner is that it encourages a shifting of the loss to the defendant
according to the duty formulated by the judge when he assumed the existence of these
facts at the outset of the case. See notes 50-52, supra, and accompanying text.
65. And it must be labelled unreasonable, even if not foreseeable, because the
foundation of liability in negligence law is blameworthiness. The defendant is found
to be blameworthy only if he has been unreasonable.
66. Lewis, supra note 20, at 145.
67. Id.
68. This method of stating the issue bears a resemblance to the "ease of associa-
tion" test espoused by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Hill v. Lundin Associates, Inc.,
260 La. 542, 550, 256 So. 2d 620, 622-23 (1972), for determining the scope of the duty.
Negligence relative to the specific interest injured is not necessary under the proximate
cause formula. Once substandard conduct is established-an act giving rise to at least
one unreasonable risk-liability for all subsequent consequences is theoretically possi-
ble save the limiting effect of proximate cause. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248
N.Y. 339, 347-56, 162 N.E. 99, 102-03 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). Professor Cowan
describes this as "an intermediate position between liability for all harm however
caused, and liability only to the restricted class foreseeably subjected to unreasonable
risk." Cowan, supra note 61, at 53. See notes 50-52, supra, and accompanying text.
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only if his conduct was commensurate with the penalty. Fur-
thermore, the question of the extent of liability is handled more
or less as a whole issue by the same body of individuals who
determine the facts. It enables a jury to respond to the ultimate
legal question with a "homely blend of fact and policy that is
so deep rooted in our approach to everyday problems."" The
effect of the duty-risk concept of allocation of power is to signif-
icantly undermine this wholistic approach.
In instructing the jury in Lynch concerning the scope of
Fisher's employee's duty, the judge would presumably inform
them that if they found the employee's parking of the truck to
be the cause-in-fact of Lynch's injury, and that the em-
ployee's conduct was negligent, then under the law they must
hold Fisher liable for the loss. Of course, it is hard to imagine
a judge who would follow Dean Green's suggestion here,
because he would realize the absurdity of even having a jury
if he were to tell them what constitutes actionable negligence
through the use of a standard drawn from the particular facts
of the case at hand. In practice, then, this instruction should
be avoided. To what degree, however, do a jury's deliberations
on cause-in-fact and negligence track the judge's inquiry into
scope of duty?
.The Jury's Concurrence
Cause-in-Fact
Professor Malone has remarked that "the evaluation
which the trier will make of fact data will necessarily be af-
fected by the purpose he is seeking to serve." 0 As explained
above, the judge "actually selects a 'condition' and for legal
purposes invests it with the character of a 'cause' in determin-
ing whether a declaration states a cause of action."' If the
evidence is sufficient to raise a reasonable inference of cause-
in-fact, the judge, in submitting the issue, is asking the jury for
a ratification of his initial conclusion. 2 In Lynch, the jury
69. Malone, supra note 1, at 66.
70. Id. at 62.
71. Lewis, supra note 20, at 145. This process was referred to previously, see notes
53-60, supra, and accompanying text, and is now elaborated on with reference to the
jury's consideration of the cause issue.
72. See notes 53-62, supra, and accompanying text.
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would be asked to pass judgment upon whether the parking of
the truck contributed substantially to the plaintiffs injury. A
Louisiana court would probably further define "substantial
factor" as a necessary antecedent: "But for the defendant's
conduct in parking the truck, would the plaintiff have been
shot?"" Dean Green argues that this is merely a fact issue,
hardly ever an area in which the litigation should be centered;
once dealt with initially, causal relation should have no role in
the consideration or disposition of other issues.7 4 Actually, it is
a purposeful inquiry, and when framed as the above-mentioned
but-for test, allows a large amount of conjecture which can be
given a direction in accordance with policy aims of the judge
when deciding the duty issue, or conformed to the visceral
reactions of the jury in deciding the facts in light of the evi-
dence submitted. 75
The test of causal relation, then, is citing an agency with
an end in mind, based upon the nature of the agency's relation-
ship with the end. 76 The jury's function or objective is to deter-
mine blameworthiness, and common sense requires that this
be based on causal relation. The evidence suggesting Fisher's
conduct as a cause of Lynch's injury is evaluated, not on some
abstract plane devoid of ethical considerations as Green would
insist, but in terms of the jury's innate sense as to what is
necessary to constitute blameworthiness.77
73. This seems to be the course the Louisiana Supreme Court followed in Dixie
Drive-it-Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298 (1962).
See Ainsworth v. Treadway, 361 So. 2d 957, 961 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
74. Green, supra note 21, at 548; Green, supra note 32, at 35.
75. The distinction between the two views is more subtle than is at first appar-
ent. Professor Malone would agree with Dean Green that the issue of cause is not the
point at which judgmental faculties should be introduced. However, the fact that the
issue cannot be decided apart from the context of the particular case, and the purpose
of determining liability, to a certain degree prevents the neat distinction between cause
and other issues that Dean Green attempts to maintain.
76. See Lewis, supra note 21, at 158-60.
77. Id. at 155. Also consider the following as authority for this view:
Causality is not so much in the events themsleves as in what we choose to pick
out as the cause from a number of antecedent phenomena. It explains much,
including the distinction between cause and condition .... Thus Mr. Bradley
.. .says, "if we want to discover a particular cause (and nothing else is a
discovery), we must make a distinction in the 'sum."' Then, as before, we are
asked for a principle by which to effect the distinction between them. And, for
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As far as the actual thought processes responsible for re-
solving the question of liability, it must be acknowledged that
the causation issue, to the degree it is influenced by normative
judgments, "insists upon spilling itself throughout every area
of the controversy.""8 This is not to say that one cannot make
a distinction between the identifying of defendant's conduct as
a necessary condition to plaintiff's injury and, on the other
hand, charging him with the loss. In fact, treating the problem
in this manner as duty-risk does improves immensely the clar-
ity of decision-making on the appellate level. A judge is set free
to explain why, for policy reasons, society will not regard "this
cause" as "a cause" for the purpose of forcing the defendant
to compensate the victim. In order to refuse to impose liability,
the judge need no longer deny that the defendant actually
caused, to some extent, plaintiff's harm. However, this is
merely a change in the method of actually articulating the
conclusions reached. 9 The increase in clarity results from the
implementation of an improved language technique. With re-
myself, I return to the statement that I know of none which is sound, we seem
to effect this distinction always to suit a certain purpose; and it appears to
consist in our mere adoption of a special point of view.
G. ARNOLD, PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO LEGAL EVIDENCE AND OTHER CONSTRUCTIONS OF LAW
274-75 (2d ed. 1913). See also:
We do not decide the Idea of Space, or Time, or Efficient Cause from the
phenomena about us, but necessarily look at phenomena as subordinate to these
ideas from the beginning of our reasoning. It is true, our ideas of relations of
Space, and Time, and Force may become much more clear by our familiarizing
ourselves with particular phenomena; but still, the Fundamental Ideas are not
generated but unfolded; not extracted from the external world, but evolved from
the world within. In like manner, in the contemplation of organic structures, we
consider each part as subservient to some use, and we cannot study the structure
as organic without such a conception. This notion of adaption-this Idea of an
End-may become much more clear and impressive by seeing it exemplified
in particular cases. But still, though suggested and evoked by special cases, it
is not furnished by them. If it be not supplied by the mind itself, it can never
be logically deduced from the phenomena. It is not a portion of the facts which
we study, but it is a principle which connects, includes, and renders them in-
telligible; as our other Fundamental Ideas do the classes of facts to which they
respectively apply.
2 W. WHEWELL, PHILOSOPHY OF THE INDUCTIVE SCIENCES 109-10 (1847).
78. See Malone, supra note 69, at 61.
79. "[The terms 'rights' and 'duties'] we use to symbolize the conclusions of the
judge in imposing or denying responsibility after a summing up of all pertinent fac-
tors. " L. GREEN, supra note 5, at 30.
1979] 1101
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
spect to a jury, the distinction is really not feasible. The jury
does not have the responsibility of communicating the ration-
ale of the decision, but of rendering it. They are not concerned
with the language technique, but in resolving the issue at hand.
Intellectual categorizing or judgment-passing accompanies the
physical perception of every event. The allocation of power
concept of the duty-risk theory (as opposed to the theory as a
mere language-technique) is therefore anathema to actual
practice for two reasons. First, if it seeks to prohibit the jury
from morally evaluating the merits of the whole case, it is
unrealistic in light of the way people actually classify sensory
data. Secondly, the concept of "relative negligence" itself, if
employed, requires the jury to "make law" in determining the
ultimate legal issue of liability, even if only as a concurrence,
since the decisional calculus involved substantially parallels
the judge's inquiry into scope of duty. For the jury to use
"absolute negligence," on the other hand, would be a totally
vain endeavor if the judge has already drawn the parameters
of the scope of duty when considering defendant's conduct and
plaintiffs harm in a causal sequence. Furthermore, if foreseea-
bility marks the limits of negligence, and scope of duty as
expanded by other factors is not so restricted, it does the dis-
trict court judge little good in Louisiana. Without a judgment
n.o.v., the lack of of the jury's concurrence on the negligence
issue will render irrelevant any concept of a broadened duty of
care."0
Negligence
It seems, then, that the jury will select the conduct of the
defendant "as a substantial factor in the death of the deceased
by the test of negligence itself . . . . [B]oth the matter of
negligence and cause are tested by the culpability . . . of the
person sought to be charged.""1 It was the value or lack of value
of Fisher's employee's act that made it an appreciable factor
in the shooting of Lynch, and at the same time made it negli-
gent."2 This is easily appreciated when one considers that
80. See note 30, supra, and accompanying text.
81. Lewis, supra note 20, at 160, A tort case thus turns upon a qualitative assess-
ment of the defendant's act.
82. Id.
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causal relation is recognized for certain remote (in terms of
time and space) consequences in the case of intentional torts;
the quality of defendant's act rather than its physical and
temporal proximity with the injury, is the dispositive factor.
Nevertheless, the negligence issue is posed to the jury as a
separate instruction. The difference with the cause-in-fact in-
struction is simply that here, the jury is encouraged to inten-
tionally exercise their normative judgments in evaluating the
moral and ethical quality of the defendant's conduct. In Lynch,
the instruction should read as follows: Was the defendant neg-
ligent with respect to the injury suffered by plaintiff?3 As a
further explanation, the court would center the inquiry on the
foreseeability of the injury and the failure to use due care to
avoid it. Again, one must realize that the question of substand-
ard conduct is analyzed specifically in relation to the risk of
harm that resulted in plaintiff's injury. In other words, the
question of negligence is not satisfied solely if the jury can
perceive some unreasonable dangers associated with the defen-
dant's conduct, for instance the chance that an oncoming mo-
torist would collide with the back of Fisher's truck. Rather, it
must conclude that Fisher violated a duty of care that would
have protected against Lynch getting shot, and therefore his
conduct constituted actionable negligence. Thus, negligence is
only actionable if it is selected as the "proximate cause" of the
injury to the plaintiff. 4 This is, as demonstrated earlier, 5 noth-
83. Green, supra note 32, at 38.
84. Green, supra note 54, at 423. Dean Green states: "And it must always be
remembered that negligence to be actionable must be so toward the plaintiff and not
merely conduct subject to condemnation." Id. at 253. Compare this language with the
following quote from Justice Cardozo:
In every instance, before negligence can be predicted of a given act, back of the
act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining, the observ-
ance of which would have averted or avoided the injury .... What the plaintiff
must show is "a wrong" to herself, i.e., a violation of her own right, and not
merely a wrong to someone else, nor conduct "wrongful" because unsocial, but
not "a wrong" to anyone .... Negligence in the abstract, apart from things
related, is surely not a tort, if indeed it is understandable at all.
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. at 343-45, 162 N.E. at 99-101. See F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 38, at 1019, 1026, 1060; W. PROSSER, supra note 25, at
254-60; Cowan, supra note 61; Green, The Palsgraf Case, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 789 (1930).
85. See Notes 50-52, 58-63, supra, and accompanying text.
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ing other than the scope of duty issue passed on by the judge
at the beginning of the suit which effectively encompassed the
issues of substandard conduct, causation, and damages.
The question remains whether, if we dispense with the
allocation of power aspect of duty-risk on the district court
level, we should retain duty-risk as a language technique in
jury instructions. It must be admitted that the terms "legal
duty" and "attendant risks" are not exactly within the lay-
man's vernacular, while words like "cause" and
'reasonableness" are part of our everyday communication.
This fact coupled with the success of the juries for the most
part in handling proximate cause terminology despite the
amalgamation of explanatory charges, should point to a reten-
tion of proximate cause instructions on the district court level.
It is hoped, though, that appellate judges realize the degree to
which each of these concepts is interwoven into the fabric of a
torts case so as to prevent actual severability, and that to re-
quire as much in district court litigation is simply impractical.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that the adoption of duty-risk analysis
in Louisiana has facilitated the clarification of judicial deci-
sions and contributed substantially to the precedential value
of opinions in certain areas of the law, at least for fact situa-
tions more commonplace than that in Lynch. Appellate courts
no longer see fit to cloud their rationales in formulistic legal
jargon but freely discuss the prevalent policy considerations of
each case. However, it must be kept in mind that duty-risk is
not a different method of mentally associating conduct with
injury, but is merely a more accurate and concise guide to the
articulation of the substantive considerations each of us selects
to form judgments about external events. The point of this
comment has been to demonstrate the degree to which the
distinction between the concepts of duty, causation, and negli-
gence is the artificial creation of legal scholars to serve purely
communicative purposes. The factors which enter into the dis-
position of each are largely the same. For this reason, the at-
tempt to confine the jury to certain issues within certain limits
will meet with sure defeat. Every issue that juries have an
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opportunity to decide will involve overlapping considerations
and reflect their judgment on the whole case. Thus, the judge-
jury division of labor espoused by duty-risk scholars is simply
not achievable. However, that part of the theory which affords
the district judge the justification for taking the case out of the
jury's hands on the duty issue and grants him the leeway to
exercise his special competence on matters of law, should be
recognized and accepted. In this sense, he maintains more
effective and continuous control over the litigation. Neverthe-
less, the real benefits of duty-risk have come with its use as a
language technique, and for this reason such benefits have been
and will continue to be felt on the appellate level.8"
Mark Meyers
86. It remains only for Professor Malone to summarize what has been said above:
The effort by writers, and occasionally by courts, to oust the issue of proximate
cause from judicial usage and to reallocate the same inquiry within the judge's
exclusive domain of declaring duties has not been successful except in those
instances where the court has already become convinced that jury participation
would be unwise. Most attempts to lay down a formula that would definitively
assign to the judge and jury their respective functions in administering the
proximate cause issue have become lost in the tangled undergrowth of the law.
This, I believe, is as it should be ......
Malone, supra note 1, at 98.
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